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California's New General Corporation Law:
Directors' Liability To Corporations

Always do right; this will gratify some people and astonish
the rest.

Mark Twain
Any statute which attempts to regulate the conduct of corporate
directors must do so within the confines of two competing policy considerations. The first of these is the necessity of attracting and retaining
competent persons to fill directorship positions.' A scheme which
exposes a director to numerous lawsuits may, by deterring responsible
persons from accepting directorships, impede the efficient management
of the corporation2 and thereby harm the very stockholders and credi-

tors the scheme is designed to protect. The second consideration is
protection of shareholders and creditors from wrongful and negligent

acts of directors. 3 A system which insulates directors from liability
leaves injured stockholders and creditors little redress for their griev-

ances and fails to deter unscrupulous directors from wrongdoing.
The newly enacted Division 1 (General Corporation Law) of the
California Corporations Code4 will significantly change California law
1. See W. KNEPPER, LiAamrrY OF CORPORATE OFcERs AND Dmncrons §16.01,
at 407 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as KNPPER].
2. Comment, Indemnification of Directors and Officers; Public Policy vs. Corporate Responsibility, 48 J. URBAN L. 957, 957 (1971).
In 1969 the Wall Street Journal reported that due to increased exposure to liability
"scores of men are politely declining offers they once would have jumped at to serve
on prestigious boards . .. . There now is a real shortage of competent men willing
and able to serve as directors." Wall Street Journal, Mar. 13, 1969, at 1, as quoted in
KYNupmt, supranote 1, §16.01, at 406.
3. See, e.g., N. LATriN, TRE LAW OF CORPORATIONS §103 (2d ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as IAriN].
4. A.B. 376, CAL. STATS. 1975, c. 682 (effective January 1, 1977) [hereinafter
all citations and references to the New General Corporation Law, enacted, CAL. STATS.
1975, c. 682, will be cited as or referred to as New CAL. CORP. CODE or New Code].
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relating to directors' liability to the corporation. These changes include
a statutory definition of the standards of loyalty and care imposed upon
directors,' new procedures for bringing an action against a director
including the creation of a creditors' derivative suit,6 and expanded
indemnification provisions. 7 While many of the new provisions are
modeled after or are similar to statutes found in other states,8 others,
such as the creditors' derivative suit, appear to be wholly original and
will therefore present novel questions of interpretation and practice.

This comment will review those portions of the New Code relating to
directors' liability which represent significant changes from existing
California law. Further, the comment will attempt to identify the
questions raised by the new provisions and suggest possible resolutions.

Finally, the conclusion of this comment will offer suggestions as to the
New Code's success at navigating between the Scylla of excessive director exposure to liability and the Charybdis of inadequate protection of
stockholders and creditors.
DIRECTORS' STANDARDS OF LOYALTY AND CARE

Section 309 of the New Corporations Code sets forth the requirement
that directors perform their duties "in good faith, in a manner such
director believes to be in the best interests of the corporation and with
such care, including reasonable inquiry, as an ordinarily prudent person
in a like position would use under similar circumstances." This lanSee generally RE iEw oF SELEcrED 1975 CA oRNIA LEGISLATION, this volume at 258
(General Corporation Law).
5. New CAL. CoRp. CODE §309.
6. New CAL. CoRP. ConE §316.
7. New CAL. CoRP. CoDE §317.
8. See note 11 infra.
9. New CAL. CoRp. CoDE §309 provides that
(a) A director shall perform the duties of a director, including the duties as
a member of any committee of the board upon which the director may serve,
in good faith, in a manner such director believes to be in the best interests
of the corporation and with such care, including reasonable inquiry, as an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under similar circumstances.
(b) In performing the duties of a director, a director shall be entitled to rely
on information, opinions, reports or statements, including financial statements
and other financial data, in each case prepared or presented by:
(1) One or more officers or employees of the corporation whom the director
believes to be reliable and competent in the matters presented,
(2) Counsel, independent accountants or other persons as to matters which
the director believes to be within such person's professional or expert competence, or
(3) A committee of the board upon which the director does not serve, as
to matters within its designated authority, which committee the director believes to merit confidence,
so long as, in any such case, the director acts in good faith, after reasonable
inquiry when the need therefor is indicated by the circumstances and without
knowledge that would cause such reliance to be unwarranted.
(c) A person who performs the duties of a director in accordance with sub-
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guage is based upon a proposed revision to the American Bar Association's Model Business Corporations Act 0 and, while new to California,

it is similar to that used in the statutes of other states..'

It is clearly

intended that the standard set forth is exclusive, as the section provides

that a director who conforms to this standard "shall have no liability
based on any alleged failure to discharge the . . . obligations as a

director."'12 The standard encompasses both the directors' duty of
loyalty to the corporation and the directors' duty of care in managing
corporate affairs. To analyze the impact Section 309 will have on
California corporations, it will be necessary to determine existing California law defining each of these duties, and to examine interpretations

of the language of the new section given by various commentators and
the courts of other states.
A.

Directors'Duty of Loyalty
California has long required directors of corporations to perform their

duties in good faith.' 3 This requirement is embodied in the Old
Code,14 which states that directors must exercise their powers "in good
faith, and with a view to the interests of the corporation."'" As Section
309 of the New Code retains essentially the same language, it may be
assumed that previous decisions defining the contours of the good faith
divisions (a) and (b) shall have no liability based upon any alleged failure
to discharge the person's obligations as a director.
10. CALIFORnIA LEGISLA RE, ASSEmLY SELECT CoNmITTEn ON THE REVISION OF
THEi CORPORATIONS CODE, REPORT OF THE ASSEMBLY SELECT COMMITrEE ON THE RE-

VISION OF THE CORPORATIONS CODE 48 (1975) [hereinafter cited as ASSEmBLY REPORT].
11. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. §22-713; IDAHo CODE ANN.§30-142; MIH. Cowd. LAWS
ANN. §450.1541; MINN. STAT. ANN. §310.31; N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw §717 (McKinney
1963); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.§5-35; S.C. CODE ANN. §12-18.15.
12. The Assembly Select Committee Report states "[tbhe purpose of this subdivision is to relieve a person from any liability by reason of being or having been a director
of a corporation, if that person has exercised his duties in the manner contemplated by
this section." ASSEMBLY REPORT, supranote 10, at 54.
Section 300 of the New Corporations Code provides an exception to the application
of this standard to directors. This section permits shareholders in close corporations
to enter shareholders' agreements which alter the traditional relationship between directors and shareholders. See Berger, California'sNew General Corporation Law: Close
and Closely-Held Corporations,this volume at 585. New CAL. CORP. CODE §300(d) provides that such an agreement
shall, to the extent and so long as the discretion or powers of the board in
its management of corporate affairs is controlled by such agreement, impose
upon each shareholder who is a party thereto liability for managerial acts performed or omitted by such person pursuant thereto that is otherwise imposed
by this division upon directors, and the directors shall be relieved to that extent
from such liability.
13. One of the earliest cases to so hold was Wright v. Oroville Mining Co., 40
Cal. 20, 27 (1870).
14. CAL. CORP. CODE §§100-35302, enacted, CAL. STATS. 1947, c. 1038 (effective
until January 1, 1977) [hereinafter all citations and references to the General Corporation Law enacted in 1947 will be cited as or referred to as CAL. CoRP. CODE or Old
Code].
15. CAL. CORP. CODE §820.
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standard remain "good law."' 6 Thus an examination of the dimensions
of permissible director conduct must begin with an analysis of existing
case law concerning director good faith.
"Good faith" in the context of 'the director-corporation relationship
has been judicially defined as a "state of mind denoting honesty of
purpose, freedom from intention to defraud, and, generally speaking,
7 This good faith
* . . being faithful to one's duty or obligation.'
standard is often expressed in terms of a "fiduciary duty, 1 8 though it is
,well settled that directors are not trustees of the corporation in the strict
sense of the term. 9 The cornerstone of -this fiduciary duty is the
prohibition against any sort of personal gain from one's activities as
director ° unless all who have an interest in the corporation are informed
and have consented. 2 1 Examples of situations in which the application
of the good faith standard has rendered directors of California corporations liable for their conduct include entering a corporation into a harsh
22
bargain with another corporation in which the director had an interest,
the use of the position of director to obtain a majority or controlling
interest in the corporation, 23 the passing of trade secrets to a competitor,24 the use of the position of director to recruit personnel for another
corporation in which the director had an interest, 25 the purchase of
16. It is a cardinal principle of statutory construction that where legislation
is framed in the language of an earlier enactment on the same or analogous
subject, which has been judicially construed, there is a very strong presumption
of intent to adopt the construction as well as the language of the prior enactment.
Holmes v. McColgan, 17 Cal. 2d 426, 430, 110 P.2d 428, 430 (1941).
17. Efron v. Kalmanovitz, 249 Cal. App. 2d 187, 192, 57 Cal. Rptr. 248, 251
(1967); see also 1 H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, CALIFORNIA CORPORATION LAWS §87
(4th ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as 1 BALLANrNE & STERLING].
18. National Auto. Cas. & Ins. Co. v. Payne, 261 Cal. App. 2d 403, 413, 67 Cal.
Rptr. 784, 790 (1968); Brown v. North Ventura Road Dev. Co., 216 Cal. App. 2d 227,
232-33, 30 Cal. Rptr. 568, 571 (1963); Tevis v. Beigel, 174 Cal. App. 2d 90, 96, 344
P.2d 360, 364 (1959); Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App.
2d 405, 420, 241 P.2d 66, 75 (1952); 6 B. WrrKN, Su mARY OF CALiFoRNIA LAw, Corporations§80 (8th ed. 1974).
19. Brown v. North Ventura Road Dev. Co., 216 Cal. App. 2d 227, 232-33, 30
Cal. Rptr. 568, 571 (1963); Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal.
App. 2d 405, 419, 241 P.2d 66, 74 (1952); 6 B. WITKIN,'SuMmARY OF CALIFORNIA LAiv,
Corporations §80 (8th ed. 1974).
20. Sheppard v. Wilcox, 210 Cal. App. 2d 53, 59, 26 Cal. Rptr. 412, 417 (1962);
Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 419, 241 P.2d
66, 74 (1952); 6 B. WrrKyi, SUMMARY oF CALIFORNIA LAW, Corporations§80 (8th ed.
1974).
21. Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 420, 241
P.2d 66, 74 (1952).
22. Burt v. Irvine Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 828, 47 Cal. Rptr. 392 (1965); Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 241 P.2d 66 (1952).
23. Sheppard v. Wilcox, 210 Cal. App. 2d 53, 26 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1962).
24. Components for Research, Inc. v. Isolation Products, Inc., 241 Cal. App. 2d
726, 50 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1966).
25. Bancroft-Whitney Co. v. Glen, 64 Cal. 2d 327, 411 P.2d 921, 49 Cal. Rptr.
825 (1966).

616
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property from the corporation on terms advantageous to the director, 26
and the distribution of dividends when the corporation had insufficient
assets to cover the distribution."
Under existing California law directors are presumed to act in good
faith. 28 Thus a plaintiff who wishes to establish a director's liability
must shoulder the burden of proving a lack of good faith.29 The
difficulty of sustaining this burden was demonstrated in Fairchild v.
Bank of America,3" wherein the plaintiffs alleged that defendant's
directors were improperly selecting attorneys to represent trusts for
which the defendant was trustee.81 The complaint stated that the
attorneys who recommended the defendant be named trustee were retained to represent the trusts, and that such attorneys had interests
which conflicted with those of the defendant. 32 In denying declaratory
relief the court stated:
To warrant interference by the court . . . a case must be made
out which plainly shows that such action is so far opposed to the
true interests of the corporation itself as to lead to the clear inference that no one thus acting could have been influenced by any
honest interest, but that he must have acted with an intent to suboutside purpose, regardless of the consequences to the
serve some
88
company.
By requiring a showing that "no one thus acting could have been
influenced by any honest interest," this holding appears to require that
the plaintiff establish a director's subjective bad faith before liability
may be found.
A plaintiff may avoid the seemingly harsh requirement of proving
subjective bad faith by proving that the defendant director received a
personal benefit from a corporate transaction which he or she approved.
It is well established that when personal benefit by a director is shown,
the burden shifts to the director to demonstrate that the transaction was
26. Tevis v. Beigel, 174 Cal. App. 2d 90, 344 P.2d 360 (1959).
27. Southern Calif. Home Builders v. Young, 45 Cal. App. 679, 188 P. 586 (1920).
28. Burt v. Irvine Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 828, 852, 47 Cal. Rptr. 392, 407 (1965);
Fairchild v. Bank of America, 192 Cal. App. 2d 252, 257, 13 Cal. Rptr. 491, 493
(1961); Findley v. Garret, 109 Cal. App. 2d 166, 174, 240 P.2d 421, 426 (1952); Fornaseri v. Cosmosart Realty & Bldg. Corp., 96 Cal. App. 549, 557, 274 P. 597, 600
(1929).
29. Fairchild v. Bank of America, 192 Cal. App. 2d 252, 257, 13 Cal. Rptr. 491,
493 (1961); Findley v. Garret, 109 Cal. App. 2d 166, 174, 240 P.2d 421, 426 (1952);
Fomaseri v. Cosmosart Realty & Bldg. Corp., 96 Cal. App. 549, 557, 274 P. 597, 600
(1929).
30. 192 Cal. App. 2d 252, 13 Cal. Rptr. 491 (1961).
31. Id. at 255, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 492.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 257, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
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entered in good faith. 4 In this situation the test used by the court to
determine if liability attaches is whether, under all the circumstances,
the transaction bears the earmarks of an "arms length" bargain. 5 Thus
the director must show not only his or her subjective good faith, but also
the inherent fairness of the transaction from the viewpoint of the corporation and those who have an interest therein. 6 For example, in
Sheppard v. Wilcox s7 the defendant directors had caused an issue of
stock of sufficient shares to divest the plaintiffs of control of the corporation in favor of the defendants. The defendants contended that at the
time of the issue they were unaware that it would inure to their benefit.3 8
Although the court noted that there was sufficient evidence to find
wrongful intent, it was held that defendants' intent was immaterial when
the complained of transaction worked to their benefit.3 9 By refusing to
consider the directors' actual intent, the court clearly demonstrated that
it was measuring their conduct by an objective standard.4 0
Once bad faith is established or a showing has been made that the
defendant director has benefitted from a corporate transaction, any
defense based on a theory that the defendant complied with all the
technical requirements of the regulating statute is foreclosed. 41 The
leading case on this point is Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini
Co.,4 2 in which the defendant majority directors, over the objections of
the minority directors, entered into various transactions with a sales
corporation created and wholly owned by the majority directors.4 s These
transactions were highly beneficial to the sales corporation at the expense of the plaintiff corporation. The defendant majority directors
had complied with all statutory requirements, having given proper no34. Kennerson v. Burbank Amusement Co., 120 Cal. App. 2d 157, 172, 260 P.2d
823, 832 (1953); Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405,
420, 241 P.2d 66, 75 (1952); accord, Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939).
35. Burt v. Irvine Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 828, 851, 47 Cal. Rptr. 392, 407 (1965);
Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 420, 241 P.2d
66, 75 (1952).
36. Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 420, 241
P.2d 66, 75 (1952).
37. 210 Cal. App. 2d 53, 26 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1962).
38. Id. at 60, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 417.
39. Id. at 60, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 417-18.
40. New CAL. Corp. CODE §310 applies an objective standard to determine the
validity of contracts in which a director has a material financial interest. When such
a contract has not been authorized by vote of disinterested shareholders, it is valid only
if it is "just and reasonable as to the corporationat the time it is authorized" (emphasis
added).
41. Tevis v. Beigel, 174 Cal. App. 2d 90, 97, 344 P.2d 360, 365 (1959); Kennerson
v. Burbank Amusement Co., 120 Cal. App. 2d 157, 171, 260 P.2d 823, 832 (1953);
Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 420, 241 P.2d
66, 75 (1952).
42. 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 241 P.2d 66 (1952).
43. Id. at 409, 241 P.2d at 68. The transactions provided that the sales corporation would exclusively handle the promotion and sales of all products manufactured by
the plaintiff corporation. Id. at 411, 241 P.2d at 69.
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tice and having voted on all the transactions. 4 4 Nevertheless, the court
found for the plaintiff, saying that it would not condone the "mulcting"
of the corporation45simply because the majority notified the minority of
its intent to do S0.
The foregoing discussion suggests that directors of California corporations are held to a high standard of loyalty. Directors are bound to
perform their duties in good faith, the essence of which is the absence of
any form of self-dealing. 4 6 Compliance with the good faith standard is
presumed, placing the burden of proving a want of good faith upon the
person seeking to establish liability. 47 The presumption may be overcome only by a showing of subjective bad faith on the part of the
directors.48 However, a showing of personal benefit from corporate
transactions causes the burden to shift to the directors,4 9 who must then
establish their good faith in approving the disputed corporate action
from an objective point of view." By adopting substantially the same
language as the Old Code,51 Section 309 of the New Code reaffirms and
perpetuates this standard of loyalty.
B.

Directors' Duty of Care

While California law relating to directors' duty of loyalty appears to
be well settled, the standard of care required of directors has not been
satisfactorily defined. 52 Under the Old Code statutory liability for negligence is limited to three specific causes of action: (1) the unlawful
purchase by the corporation of its own shares; (2) the making of an
unlawful distribution; and (3) the making of an unlawful loan or guarantee. r3, Although the statute does not purport to exclude other causes
44. Id. at 416-17, 241 P.2d at 73. The defendants' contention was based on full
compliance with the requirements of CAL. CORP. CODE §820.
45. Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 417, 241
P.2d 66, 73 (1952). Cf. Rankin v. Frebank Co., 47 Cal. App. 3d 75, 121 Cal. Rptr. 348
(1975), in which the defendant directors also had established a second corporation to
do a portion of the original corporation's business. Unlike Remillard, however, the
plaintiffs were shareholders who, due to a secret agreement, were unknown to the defendants. Because the defendants had made provisions protecting all known shareholders, they were found not to have breached their duty of good faith. Id. at 84-85, 121
Cal. Rptr. at 353-54.
46. See notes 20-21 and accompanying text supra.
47. See notes 28-33 and accompanying text supra.
48. See note 33 and accompanying text supra.
49. See note 34 and accompanying text supra.
50. See notes 35-40 and accompanying text supra.
51. CAL. CORP. CODE §820.
52. 6 B. Wrr aN, SUMMARY OF CALFORnorA LAW, Corporations §91 (8th ed. 1974).
53, CAL. CoRP. CODE §824 provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this division, the directors of a corporation
shall not authorize or ratify the purchase by it of its shares, or declare or pay
dividends, or authorize or ratify the withdrawal or distribution of any part of
its assets among its shareholders.
CAL. CORP. CODE §825 provides:
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of action based on negligence,54 it appears that plaintiffs suing in the
name of the corporation seldom allege director negligence. In addition,

the business judgment rule, which exempts directors from liability for
erroneous judgment in business matters, appears to have prevented most
cases of alleged negligence from being decided on the merits. 5 Finally,
the California courts have generally failed to distinguish between negli-

gence and bad faith when addressing the standard of conduct required
of directors.
One of the rare California judicial expressions of the corporate directors' standard of care is found in National Automobile Casualty and

Insurance Co. v. Payne.56 In that case the First District Court of
Appeal held that it is a director's duty to possess a knowledge of the
basic capital structure of the corporation, and that such a knowledge is a
"minimal requirement of the reasonable exercise of [the director's]
duties. ' ' 2 ' The court also found that for a director to remain unaware

of stock options noted in corporation records after obtaining stock issue
permits and participating in stock issues constituted, as a matter of law,
a "failure to exercise prudent performance of a director's duties."' 8 The
court reached these two conclusions based upon the following formulation of the standard of care: "[Directors] occupy a fiduciary relationship to the corporation and are bound to exercise that degree of care

that men of common prudence take of their own concerns."5
The "own concerns" standard set forth in National Automobile is
generally considered to be a higher standard of care than the "prudent
person in a like position" standard set forth in the New Code.60 There
In case of any wilful or negligent violation of Section 824, the directors in office at the time of the violation . . . are jointly and severally liable to the corporation or to its receiver. . . for the benefit of the creditors of the corporation or any of them and of the shareholders and owners of shares at the time
of the violation, for its debts and liabilities existing at the time of the violation
and for the full amount of any loss sustained by such holders and owners of
shares, other than shares upon which any such payment or distribution was
made, to the amount of the unlawful dividends, purchase price, withdrawal, or
other distribution.
54. See, e.g., Burt v. Irvine Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 828, 852, 47 Cal. Rptr. 392, 40708 (1965).
55. See text accompanying notes 70-77, and notes 70-73 infra.
56. 261 Cal. App. 2d 403, 67 Cal. Rptr. 784 (1968).
57.. Id. at 412, 67 Cal. Rptr. at 790.
58. Id. at 413, 67 Cal. Rptr. at 790.
59. Id. (emphasis added).
60. For example, one commentator has written:
It must be considered that directors are frequently men having other business
pursuits who serve as directors gratuitously, and that few responsible men
would want to serve as directors if they were required to be constantly in attendance as directors and were compelled to guard against injury or loss as they
would in their own concerns. In view of the more practical aspect of the situation, a more satisfactory definition of the care which a director of a corporation is bound to exercise in the performance of the functions of his position
is such care as a prudent man should exercise in like circumstances and

620
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is considerable doubt, however, whether National Automobile provides
a true representation of the standard by which the liability of directors is
presently assessed, as in that case the liability of directors was not at
issue. The plaintiff directors had discovered alleged bad faith dealing
by defendant directors, but the discovery came many years after the
disputed transactions had occurred. 1 The court made these determinations as to the plaintiff directors' duty in the course of deciding that the
statute of limitations had begun to run on the date of the disputed
transactions rather than the date of discovery.6" Furthermore, the sole,,
authority given for the proposition that directors are held to that degree
of care that men of common prudence take of their own concerns was
Sheppard v. Wilcox.63 ,A close reading of Sheppard, however, reveals
no formulation of such a standard. The dispute in Sheppard involved
corporate transactions which benefitted the directors to the derogation of
the rights of certain shareholders.6 4 Thus the Sheppard holding concerns directors' duty of loyalty and seems to be inapposite to directors'
duty of care. 65
At times California courts appear to have found director liability
based upon negligence without expressly stating so. Such a case is
Brown v. North Ventura Road Development Co.,6 6 which involved a
corporation formed for the purpose of developing a housing project.
Although cross-plaintiffs sought monetary damages for injury to the
corporation based on allegations of fraud and misrepresentation," the
cross-defendant director was held to have breached his "fiduciary duty"
in that "by reason of his mismanagement" he
failed and neglected to obtain (1) the financing of the subject land
on the terms and conditions originally agreed upon; (2) the requisite contracts for the construction and development of said project;
charged with a like duty, which care is usually but not necessarily that which
such a person would show in the conduct of his own affairs of a similar kind.
19 AM. JuR. 2d, Corporations§1277 (1965); see also KNEPPER, supra note 1, §1.03.
61. National Auto. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Payne, 261 Cal. App. 2d 403, 405-08, 67
Cal. Rptr. 784, 786-87 (1968).
62. Id. at 414-15, 67 Cal. Rptr. at 791.
63. Sheppard v. Wilcox, 210 Cal. App. 2d 53, 26 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1962).
64. Id. at 58, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 416.
65. Perhaps the court in National Automobile inferred the "own concerns" standard from the Sheppard court's refusal to accept the defendants' excuse of ignorance of
the impermissible benefits received from the corporate transactions. 210 Cal. App. 2d
53, 60, 26 Cal. Rptr. 412, 417-18 (1962). However, the defendants in Sheppard admitted that the impermissible benefit was "clearly evident." Id. at 60, 26 Cal. Rptr. at
418. Since a failure to observe something which is "clearly evident" would seem to constitute negligence under any standard, a holding that directors are held to the standard
of care men of common prudence take of their own concerns may not justifiably be
inferred from the Sheppard decision.
66. 216 Cal. App. 2d 227, 30 Cal. Rptr. 568 (1963).
67. Id. at 229, 30 Cal. Rptr. at 570.
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(3) construction and development of said land by subcontractors
in return for a percentage share of the capital stock of the corporate
defendant; (4) a release of the land by the sellers to the corporation for subdivision purposes whenever required by the corpora68
tion.
As there was no showing of benefit to the director, it appears that
Brown was decided on a theory of negligence rather than a lack of good
faith. It is significant that in Brown liability was based entirely on

omissions rather than any positive act of the defendant. 9 It appears
that in most cases in which negligent acts have been alleged the director
70
has escaped liability by invoking the business judgment rule.
The business judgment rule provides that in the absence of fraud,
breach of trust, or ultra vires act, the conduct of directors is not subject
to attack where the challenged acts are discretionary and performed in

good faith with a reasonable belief that they are in the best interests of
the corporation. 71 Thus directors are not liable for incorrect decisions
as long as they remain faithful to the corporation and use their best
business judgment. 72 The rationale for this rule is that it is not the
proper function of a court, often with the benefit of hindsight, to
substitute its judgment for the good faith business judgment of directors. 73 The rule assumes particular importance when it is remembered
that good faith on the part of directors is presumed.7 4 It has even been
stated that a court "has no power to intermeddle in the business affairs
of the corporation when there is no fraud. ' 75 This last statement seems
68. Id. at 233, 30 Cal. Rptr. at 572.
69. Professor Lattin has written:
When directors have been charged with negligence in handling the company's affairs, the facts usually show one of three types of inactivity: (1) the
director has not attended board meetings as he should and has no valid excuse
for being absent; or (2) he has not taken the time to acquaint himself with
the general aspects of the business so that he is qualified to act upon propositions when they are discussed at board meetings; or (3) he has sat quietly at
board meetings when there were indications of bad management by the officers, or perhaps downright crookedness, and has been so unconcerned or perhaps unaware of what was in the offing that he did not object or did not suggest an investigation or did not do something else that a director reasonably
capable, under similar circumstances, would have done.
ATrN,supra note 3, §78, at 275 (emphasis added).
70. E.g., Fairchild v. Bank of America, 192 Cal. App. 2d 252, 13 Cal. Rptr. 491
(1961).
71. Burt v. Irvine Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 828, 852, 47 Cal. Rptr. 392, 407 (1965);
Fairchild v. Bank of America, 192 Cal. App. 2d 252, 257, 13 Cal. Rptr. 491, 493
(1961); Olson v. Basin Oil Co., 136 Cal. App. 2d 543, 559, 288 P.2d 952, 962 (1955);
Findley v. Garret, 109 Cal. App. 2d 166, 174, 240 P.2d 421, 426 (1952); Fornaseri v.
Cosmosart Realty & Bldg. Corp., 96 Cal. App. 549, 557, 274 P. 597, 600 (1929).
72. Findley v. Garret, 109 Cal. App. 2d 166, 178, 240 P.2d 421, 428 (1952).
73. Marble v. Latchford Glass Co., 205 Cal. App. 2d 171, 178, 22 Cal. Rptr. 789,
793-94 (1962); Fairchild v. Bank of America, 192 Cal. App. 2d 252, 257, 13 Cal. Rptr.
491. 493 (1961).
74. See note 28 supra.
75. Marble v. Latchford Glass Co., 205 Cal. App. 2d 171, 179, 22 Cal. Rptr. 789,
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inconsistent with the holdings in Brown78 and is probably an overstate-

ment of the law. Nevertheless, the rule appears to have effectively
foreclosed most actions by corporations against their directors based on
77
misfeasance as distinguished from nonfeasance and malfeasance. Spe-

cific situations in which the business judgment rule has been applied by
California courts to absolve directors of liability include cases involving

the poor choice of counsel, 8 the creation of a subsidiary corporation

which led to the loss of profits by the parent corporation, 79 the decision

not to exercise an option to purchase land which would have resulted in
profits to the corporation, 0 and the issuance of preferred stock as a
dividend."1

The California courts have not clarified how the business judgment
rule, which exempts directors from liability for erroneous judgment,

may be reconciled with the notion that directors must be accountable to
the corporation for their negligence. In the only case which appears to
have addressed the problem, 2 the court found that:
There is no conflict between the two. When courts say that they
will not interfere in matters of business judgment, it is presupposed
that judgment-reasonable diligence-has in fact been exercised.
A director cannot close his eyes to what is going on about him in
the conduct of the business of the corporation and have it said that
he is exercising business judgment. Courts have properly decided
to give directors a wide latitude in the management of the affairs
of the corporation provided always that judgment, and that means
3
an honest, unbiased judgment, is reasonably exercised by them.

The court seems to be saying that liability may attach when a director
negligently fails to make a judgment. Such a statement sheds little light
on the relationship between the business judgment rule and the directors' standard of care as it merely illuminates the obvious: the business

judgment rule has no application when there has been no judgment.84
794 (1962) and Fairchild v. Bank of America, 192 Cal. App. 2d 252, 256, 13 Cal. Rptr.
491, 493 (1961) (emphasis added).
76. Although fraud was alleged, in Brown the court enjoined the cross-defendant
from holding the office of director based upon his neglect and mismanagement. 216
Cal. App. 2d at 233, 30 Cal. Rptr. at 572. See notes 66-68 and accompanying text
supra.
77. See note 70 supra.
78. Fairchild v. Bank of America, 192 Cal. App. 2d 252, 13 Cal. Rptr. 491 (1961).
79. Findley v. Garret, 109 Cal. App. 2d 166, 240 P.2d 421 (1952).
80. Fornaseri v. Cosmosart Realty & Bldg. Corp., 96 Cal. App. 549, 274 P. 597
(1929).
81. Marble v. Latchford Glass Co., 205 Cal. App. 2d 171, 22 Cal. Rptr. 789
(1962).
82. Burt v. Irvine Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 828, 47 Cal. Rptr. 392 (1965).
83. Id. at 852-53, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 408, quoting Casey v. Woodruff, 49 N.Y.S.2d
625, 643 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
84. The court's statement that judgment must be "reasonably exercised" may also
be interpreted as requiring that directors judgment be reasonable. However, such an
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Section 309 of the New Code appears designed to bring order to the
confusion surrounding the standard of care required of directors of
California corporations. 85 The relevant portion of this section provides
that a "director shall perform the duties of a director. . . with such
care, including reasonable inquiry, as an ordinarily prudent person in a
like position would use under similar circumstances." 8 6 The language
of the new section is similar to that found in the statutes of several other
states.8 7 As there exists a principle of statutory construction which
provides that the adoption of the language of a statute of another state
raises a very strong presumption of adoption of the judicial interpretation of that statute,"8 an examination of judicial interpretations of these
other statutes is necessary to determine the dimensions of the prescribed
standard of care. A review of the decisions in these states reveals that
only New York has conducted extensive litigation on the subject of
directors' duty of care."9 The New York decisions, however, prove very
instructive on four issues raised by the language of Section 309 of the
New Code.
The first of these is the degree of knowledge of corporate affairs
required of directors. New York directors have a duty to know what is
transpiring in their corporations,9" and this knowledge includes not only
actual knowledge, but also what a director should reasonably know or
discover. 91 Consequently, directors may be held liable for acts of
omission, including failure to attend meetings of the board of direcinterpretation renders meaningless the entire discussion of the business judgment rule,
as reasonableness is the standard by which negligence is determined for any act.
85. The standard set forth would apply also to directors of foreign corporations
which fulfill the requirements of New CAL. CoRP. CoDn §2115. See generally Comment, California's New General Corporation Law: Quasi-Foreign Corporations, this
volume at 673.
86. The standard is applicable in all cases, as the section provides that a person
who performs the duties of a director in accordance with this standard shall not have
liability based upon any alleged failure to discharge the person's obligations as director.
See note 9 supra.
87. See note 11 supra.
88. Erlich v. Municipal Court, 55 Cal. 2d 553, 558, 360 P.2d 334, 337, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 758, 761 (1961); Los Angeles M.T.A. v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 54
Cal. 2d 684, 688-89, 355 P.2d 905, 907, 8 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3 (1960); Holmes v. McColgan,
17 Cal. 2d 426, 430, 110 P.2d 428, 430 (1941); Estate of Potter, 188 Cal. 55, 68, 204
P. 826, 832 (1922).
89. N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAw §717 (McKinney 1963) provides:
Directors and officers shall discharge the duties of their respective positions
in good faith and with that degree of diligence, care and skill which ordinarily
prudent men would exercise under similar circumstances in like positions. In
discharging their duties, directors and officers, when acting in good faith, may
rely upon financial statements of the corporation represented to them to be correct by the president or the officer of the corporation having charge of its
books of accounts, or stated in a written report by an independent public or
certified public accountant or firm of such accountants fairly to reflect the financial condition of such corporation.
90. Platt Corp. v. Platt, 249 N.Y.S.2d 1, 6 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
91. Id.
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tors.9 2 A belief that the defendant's directorship is merely honorary
does not excuse a person from this duty of knowledge, or from other
obligations of a director."
The second issue addressed by the New York courts is whether the
nature of the corporation affects the standard of care required of directors. This issue was considered in Syracuse Television, Inc. v. Channel
9, Syracuse, Inc.,9 4 which held that "[c]are and skill in management are
relative concepts depending not only on the type of corporation, the
95
circumstances involved, but also the corporate role of the Directors."
The intent of the drafters of the New California Code to adopt a similar
interpretation is made apparent in the Report of the Assembly Select
Committee on the Revision of the Corporations Code, which states in
part:
(2) The phrase "under similar circumstances" is intended both
to recognize that the nature and extent of oversight will vary, depending upon such factors as the size, complexity and location of
activities carried on by the particular corporation, and to limit the
critical assessment of a director's performance to the time of action
or nonaction and thus prevent the harsher judgments which can invariably be made with the benefit of hindsight...
(3) The phrase "in a like position" simply recognizes that the
"care" under consideration is that which would be used by the "ordinarily prudent person" if he were director of the particular corpo98
ration.
It should be noted that in Syracuse Television the consideration of the
role of the director in the corporation was used to find a higher standard
9 7 The
of care than that imposed on other directors of the corporation.
facts indicated that the defendant directors were members of an "executive committee" and had assumed greater responsibility in the manage98
ment of the corporation than other directors not on the committee.
Therefore, it is doubtful that the holding in Syracuse Television was intended to permit directors to avoid liability by lessening the extent of
their participation in corporate affairs."
92. Id. at 6.
93. Id. at 8.
94. 273 N.Y.S.2d 16 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
95. Id. at 27.
96. ASSEMBLY REPORT, supra note 10, at 49, quoting Committee on Corporate
Laws, Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act, 29 Bus. LAWYER 947, 954
(1974).
97. Syracuse Television, Inc. v. Channel 9, Syracuse, Inc., 273 N.Y.S.2d 16, 27
(Sup. Ct. 1966).
98. Id. at 26-27.
99. California presently does not permit a director to avoid liability by pleading that
the position of director was accepted only as an accommodation and with the under-
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A third issue on which New York decisions are instructive is whether
the language of the statute abrogates the business judgment rule. The
New York courts continue to utilize the business judgment rule when
applying the statutory standard of care to conduct of directors.100 Thus,
the business judgment of directors is not reviewable by the court even
though their judgment appears to have been unsound. 10 1 Evidence that
the drafters of the New Corporations Code intended to retain the business judgment rule is found in the Assembly Select Committee Report,
wherein it is stated that "'a director should not be liable for an honest
mistake of business judgment.' "102
If the business judgment rule is considered to delineate a standard of
care, the continued use of the rule seems inconsistent with the New York
and California codes, as the codes set forth a different standard of care.
The courts, however, do not seem to apply the business judgment rule as
a standard of care, as a "standard" is a measure by which conduct is
judged, and the courts have invoked the rule to avoid passing judgment.10 3 Because the essence of the rule is the courts' refusal to review
good faith business judgment, 10 4 it would seem that the proper formulation of the rule is that there exists no cause of action based upon the
good faith business judgment of directors.' 05 Stated in this manner, the
rule is not inconsistent with any statute that sets forth a standard of care.
standing that the performance of duties would not be required. Minton v. Cavaney, 56
Cal. 2d 576, 580, 364 P.2d 473, 475-76, 15 Cal. Rptr. 641, 643-44 (1961).
Georgia has also interpreted its statute, which uses the same language as found in Section 309 of the New Corporations Code, as imposing a standard which varies according
to the type of corporation and the role of the director. GA. CODE ANN. §22-713, Comment (P. Bowman I1, Reporter of the Special Advisory Committee of the Section of Corporate and Banking Law of the State Bar of Georgia) (1970). A director may,
however, be found liable for nonparticipation in corporate affairs. Boddy v. Theiling, 129 Ga. App. 273, 276-77, 199 S.E.2d 379, 382 (1973).
100. Hanson v. Ontario Milk Products Coop., Inc., 294 N.Y.S.2d 936, 941 (Sup. Ct.
1968); but see LATIN, supra note 3, §78.
101. Hanson v. Ontario Milk Products Coop., Inc., 294 N.Y.S.2d 936, 941 (Sup. Ct.
1968).
Questions of policy of management, expediency of contracts or action, adequacy of consideration, lawful appropriation of corporate funds to advance
corporate interests, are left solely to their [directors] honest and unselfish
opinion, for their powers therein are without limitation and free from restraint,
and the exercise of them for the common and general interests of the corporation may not be questioned, although the results show that what they did was
unwise or inexpedient.
Greenbaunm v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 278 N.Y.S.2d 123, 129-30 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
Minnesota, the only other state with a comparable statute which appears to have considered the issue, also employs the business judgment rule. Warner v. E. C. Warner Co.,
226 Minn. 565, 573-75, 33 N.W.2d 721, 726-28 (1948).
102. AssEmBLY REPORT, supra note 10, at 48-49, quoting Committee on Corporate
Laws, Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act, 29 Bus. LAWYER 947, 951
(1974).
103. See text accompanying notes 71-75 supra.
104. See note 73 and accompanying text supra.
105. This formulation of the rule does not preclude actions based upon directors'
negligence in preparation for making a business decision, such as failure to consult commonly used market reports.
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Furthermore, the retention of the business judgment rule seems highly desirable. First, the imposition of liability for errors of business
judgment would greatly inhibit those responsible for managing corporations from investing or entering any but the most secure of enterprises.
When it is remembered that many of today's major industries were once
high-risk enterprises, it becomes obvious that inhibiting corporate risktaking would have a deleterious effect on the nation's economy. Second,
if dissatisfied shareholders were permitted to maintain actions anytime
they disagree with a decision of the board of directors, corporations
would soon be run by the courts instead of those to whom the law
entrusts their management. 1 6 Last, in a business context, it is simply
inequitable to judge a person's conduct on the basis of wisdom acquired
after the event. 11 Thus the retention of the business judgment rule is
not only consistent with the New Code, but is wise in terms of public
policy.
The fourth and final issue addressed by the New York courts is
procedural. New York requires that a plaintiff suing under its statute
specify whether the action is brought under a theory of bad faith or a
theory of negligence. 0 8 A failure to distinguish between the two
theories renders a complaint deficient. 0 9 Such a requirement would
seem to be beneficial, as distinguishing in the complaint between negligence and acts of bad faith will aid the courts in developing a clearly
defined body of law relating to director negligence. The development
in the New York courts of separate bodies of law for director bad faith
and negligence has led to a clearer exposition of the director duty of care
than is found in the California decisions. 10
An important issue not addressed by the courts in states which have a
similar statutory standard of care is the extent to which a director may
rely on information received from other persons. Section 309 of the
New Code specifically permits a director to rely on information, opinions, reports or statements, including financial statements and other
financial data prepared by officers, employees, counsel, independent
accountants, or any committee or board on which the director does not
sit, as long as such director's reliance is in good faith and with reasonable inquiry.'
The new section greatly expands the reliance permitted
106. Carson, Current Phases of Derivative Actions Against Directors, 40 MICH. L.
Rav. 1125, 1130 (1942).
107. Id. at 1145.
108. Kutik v. Taylor, 364 N.Y.S.2d 387, 389 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
109. Id.
110. A plaintiff may still plead negligence and bad faith as alternative theories. See,
3 B. wrTKN, CALiFORNA PROCEDuRE, Pleading §§290-92, 296 (2d ed. 1971).

111. See note 9 supra.
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by a director, as the Old Code permits a director to rely only on a
balance sheet or profit and loss statement of the corporation furnished to
him by the president or officer in charge of supervision of accounts, or
by a certified public accountant." 2 The Assembly Select Committee
Report, in referring to the new reliance provision, states:
[N]o duty of inquiry comparable to that contained in Section 11
of the United States Securities Act of 1933 was intended to be imposed upon directors in judging the competence and reliability of
the persons on whom they rely, unless there are circumstances
which would cause any reasonable man in a like position to make
such an inquiry." 18
The report sheds further light on the reliance provision:
Inherent in the good faith standard is the requirement that, in order
to be entitled to rely on such reports, statements, opinions and
other matters, the director must have read, or been present at the
meeting at which is orally presented, the report or statement in
would
question and must not have any pertinent knowledge which
4
cause him to conclude that he should not rely thereon."
The expanded reliance provision seems to be desirable in that it recognizes the realities of management in the modem corporation, and by
doing so, should attract competent persons to assume directorships without seriously jeopardizing the protection afforded stockholders.
Assuming that California will adopt the interpretations of similar
statutory language in other states" 5 as well as the intent expressed by
the drafters in the Assembly Select Committee Report; a discernible
standard of care emerges from Section 309 of the New Code. A
director is required to perform his or her duties as would an ordinarily
prudent person in like circumstances.",6 The diligence required of a
director varies with the nature, size and type of the corporation, as well
as the director's role in the management of the corporation.'17 This
varying standard does not, however, excuse a director from attendance
at meetings or a basic knowledge of the corporation's structure and
operations. 11 This standard for determining negligence may be applied in cases arising from omissions or negligent acts other than business decisions." 9 A director may not incur liability for decisions
112. CAL. CoRP. Conv §829.
113. ASSEMBLY REPORT, supra note 10, at 53-54.
114. Id. at 53, quoting Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Model Business CorporationAct, 29 Bus. LAwYER 951, 954 (1974).
115. See note 88 and accompanying text supra.
116. See note 9 supra.
117. See notes 94-96 and accompanying text supra.
118. See notes 90-92, 97-99 and accompanying text supra.
119. Odd Fellows Mutual Aid Ass'n v. James, 63 Cal. 598 (1883) (defendant direc-
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relating to business matters, even though those decisions prove to be
unwise, 120 and a director may not incur liability for good faith reliance
on reports of officers, employees, counsel, or other experts. 12' The

standard of care set forth in this section is exclusive, as a person may
incur no liability by virtue of being a director if he or she conforms to
22
this standard.'
The foregoing suggests that the New Corporations Code has satisfactorily defined the standard of conduct that will be required of directors of
California corporations. Such a standard has little value, however, if
the procedures available for enforcement of the standard are so costly
and time consuming as to fail to provide adequate protection for those
injured. In apparent recognition of this fact, the New Corporations
Code contains new procedures for enforcement of certain violations of

the directors' duties.
STATUTORY CAUSES OF ACTION AND PROCEDURES

Section 316 of the New Corporations Code provides that directors
who fail to conform to the required standards of loyalty and care in
approving any of the following actions may be held jointly and severally
liable to the corporation and those entitled to sue in its name: (1) the

making of any unlawful distribution to the corporation's shareholders; 23 (2) the distribution of corporate assets to shareholders after the
institution of dissolution proceedings without providing for all known
liabilities; and (3) the making of an unlawful loan or guarantee. 24 A
tor placed plaintiff non-profit corporation's funds in an insecure place, resulting in their
theft).
120. See notes 101-102 and accompanying text supra.
121. See text accompanying notes 111-114 supra.
122. See notes 9 and 12 supra.
123. New CAL. CORP. CODE §§500-503 define unlawful distributions. See generally
Comment, Californies New General CorporationLaw: Dividends and Reacquisitionsof
Shares, this volume at 645.
124. New CAL. CORP. CODE §316 provides:
(a) Subject to the provisions of Section 309, directors of a corporation who
approve any of the following corporate actions shall be jointly and severally
liable to the corporation for the benefit of all of the creditors or shareholders
entitled to institute an action under subdivision (c):
(1) The making of any distribution to its shareholders to the extent that it
is contrary to the provisions of Sections 500 through 503, inclusive.
(2) The distribution of assets to shareholders after institution of dissolution proceedings of the corporation, without paying or adequately providing for
all known liabilities of the corporation, excluding any claims not filed by creditors within the time limit set in a notice given to creditors under Chapters
18, 19 and 20.
(3) The making of any loan or guaranty contrary to Section 315.
(b) A director who is present at a meeting of the board, or any committee
thereof, at which action specified in subdivision (a) is taken and who abstains
from voting shall be considered to have approved the action.
(c) Suit may be brought in the name of the corporation to enforce the liability under subdivision (a) against any or all directors liable by any one or
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director who is present at a meeting of the board at which one of the
above transactions is approved and who abstains from voting in that
transaction shall be deemed to have approved it for the purposes of
affixing liability.' 25 These causes of action are not new to California as
similar provisions are contained in the Old Corporations Code.120 The
New Code does, however, change the procedures for enforcing liability
under these three causes of action by creating a creditors' derivative suit
and by removing procedural obstacles in shareholders'derivative actions
based thereon. To determine the propriety and effect of these changes
it is necessary to examine the purposes for which they were enacted and
the manner in which they may be applied.
The Creditors'DerivativeAction
The Old Corporations Code requires that a creditor seeking a judgment against a director on the basis of a statutory cause of action must
A.

more creditors of the corporation whose debts or claims arose prior to the time
of any of the corporate actions specified in subdivision (a) and who have not
consented to the corporate action, whether or not they have reduced their
claims to judgment, or by any one or more holders of shares outstanding at
the time of any violation of Section 502 or 503 specified in subdivision (a) (1)
who have not consented to the corporate action, without regard to the provisions of Section 800.
(d) The damages recoverable from a director under this section shall be
the amount of the illegal distribution or the loss suffered by the corporation
as a result of the illegal loan or guaranty, as the case may be, but not exceeding
the liabilities of the corporation owed to nonconsenting creditors at the time
of the violation and the injury suffered by nonconsenting shareholders, as the
case may be.
(e) Any director sued under this section may implead all other directors
liable and may compel contribution, either in that action or in an independent
action against directors not joined in that action.
(f) Directors liable under this section shall also be entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the corporation:
(1) With respect to subdivision (a) (1), against shareholders who received
the distribution.
(2) With respect to subdivision (a) (2), against shareholders who received
the distribution of assets.
(3) With respect to subdivision (a) (3), against the person who received
the loan or guaranty.
Any director sued under this section may file a cross-complaint against the person or persons who are liable to such director as a result of the subrogation
provided for in this subdivision or may proceed against them in an independent
action.
If enacted, A.B. 2849, 1975-76 Regular Session, as amended, April 21, 1976 will amend
subdivision (c) to read as follows:
(c) Suit may be brought in the name of the corporation to enforce the liability
1) under subdivision (a) (I) against any or all directors liable by the persons
entitled to sue under Section 506 (b), (2) under subdivision (a)(2) or (a)(3)
against any or all directors liable by any one or more creditors of the corporation whose debts or claims arose prior to the time of any of the corporate
actions specified in subdivision (a) (2) or (a) (3) and who have not consented
to the corporate action, whether or not they have reduced their claims to judgment, or (3) under subdivision (a) (3) against any or all directors liable by
any one or more holders of shares outstanding at the time of any corporate
action specified in subdivision (a) (3) who have not consented to the corporate action, without regard to the provisions of Section 800.
125. New CAL. CORP. CODE §316.
126. CAL. CORP. CODE §§824, 825.

630
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first bring an action against the corporation. 2 7 A creditor may do this
either by bringing an action against both the corporation and its directors or by first obtaining a judgment against the corporation and then
suing the director.'2 8 While such a requirement may be desirable
insofar as it protects directors from having to defend against meritless
claims by placing the resources of the corporation on the side of the
defense, it appears to have two major disadvantages. The first of these
is that the procedure creates multiple litigation by requiring an action
against the corporation as well as against the director. The second
disadvantage is that the existing procedure may not protect all creditors
injured by a wrongful act of a director, as it gives an individual creditor
a right of action, rather than giving a creditor a right of action in a
representative capacity for all creditors.129 The existing procedure
creates a "first-come, first-served" situation in which the first creditor to
sue may recover all his or her damages while creditors who subsequently
sue may find the director without assets to pay further judgments. 130
Subdivision (c) of Section 316 of the New Code permits a creditor to
institute an action in the name of the corporation against any and all
directors who approve one or more of the actions proscribed by subdivision (a) of that section.' 3 ' This provision is designed to alleviate the
problem of multiple litigation by eliminating the requirement of an
action against the corporation.13 2 However, whether the new procedure
eliminates the problem of first-come, first-served recoveries depends on
the interpretation given to the language found in subdivision (d) of new
Section 316. This subdivision provides that in a creditors' suit brought
under Section 316, the damages recoverable from a director are the
amount of loss suffered by the corporation, "but not to exceed the
liabilities owed to nonconsenting creditors ... ."133 If this language is

construed to mean the "nonconsenting creditors" who brought the suit,
the result is little different than the situation which presently exists, as
this allows only the creditor suing to recover and requires other creditors
to bring their own actions. If, however, the language is construed to
mean all nonconsenting creditors entitled to recover, the new procedure
127. CAL. CORP. CODE §826.
128. CAL. CORP. CODE § 826.

129. Note, Corporations: Civil Liability of Directors for Unlawful Distributions:
California CorporationsCode Sections 825 and 826: Who May Sue: Nature and Extent
of Recovery, ProposedAmendments, 39 CAL. L REv. 562, 563 (1951).
130. Id.
131. See note 124 supra. Oddly, the creation of the creditors' derivative suit is not
addressed in the Report of the Assembly Select Committee on the Revision of the Corporations Code.
132. Elimination of multiple litigation is the sole reason given by the Assembly Select Committee Report for the changes made by new Section 316. AssEBMLY REPORT,
supra note 10, at 60.
133. See note 124 supra.
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will avoid the problems of the existing code by protecting the rights of
all creditors. In such a case, as with shareholders' derivative suits, the
judgment will be paid to the corporation for the benefit of all creditors
entitled to recovery. Presumably, when the amount recoverable from a
director is insufficient to cover all claims of creditors, the judgment will
be apportioned.13 4
While the language contained in subdivision (d) of Section 316 is
susceptible to either interpretation, a reading of the entire section seems
to favor the latter. Subdivision (c) states that creditors may sue in the
name of the corporation "to enforce the liabilily under subdivision (a)."
Subdivision (a) proclaims that directors shall be jointly and severally
liable to the corporation "for the benefit of all of the creditors or
shareholders entitled to institute an action under subdivision (c)." Thus
it would seem that the language "nonconsenting creditors" in subdivision (d) in fact refers to all nonconsenting creditors entitled to bring an
action.
Not all creditors of the corporation are entitled to bring an action
under Section 316 of the New Code. The section limits creditors who
may sue in the name of the corporation to those whose debts or claims
arose prior to the time of the director's wrongful act. 18 5 This limitation
is analogous to the contemporaneous ownership requirement generally
found in shareholders' derivative suits,'36 and would seem designed to
serve the same purpose. As in shareholders' actions, the limitation
prevents those who knew or should have known of the conduct sued
upon at the time they entered into a transaction with the corporation
from receiving an unjust recovery, and prevents persons from entering a
transaction with the corporation for the sole purpose of instigating or
joining an action against a director.13 7 Section 316 further limits the
creditors who may bring suit in the name of the corporation to those
who did not consent to the challenged corporate action. 138 This limitation appears to be designed to prevent an unjust recovery by those who
knew and agreed to, or perhaps even encouraged, the directors to take
the action for which they are now being sued.
In most cases shareholders who wish to prosecute a derivative action
134. The problem of insufficient funds to pay all liabilities to creditors is also somewhat mitigated by provisions giving a defendant director rights of contribution and subrogation. See note 124 supra.
135. See note 124 supra.

136. The contemporaneous ownership requirement is somewhat relaxed in the New
Code. Compare New CAL. CoRP. CoDE §800 with CAL. CoRp. CODE §834.

137. Ballantine, Abuses of Shareholders Derivative Suits: How Far Is California's
New "Security For Expenses" Act Sound Regulation?, 37 CAL. L. REV. 399, 413-15

(1949).
138. See note 124 supra.
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must comply with certain procedural requirements imposed by statute.139 These requirements include a prior demand upon the corporation to take the action desired by the complaining shareholder, 40 and
the furnishing, upon motion of defendant and order of the court, of
sufficient security for the anticipated costs of litigation to the corporation.' 4 ' The New Code, however, does not impose these procedural
requirements on creditorswho seek to sue in the name of the corporation. To determine if this exemption is justified, it is necessary to
examine the rationale for the procedural requirements as applied to
shareholders.
1. Creditors'Derivative Actions-Absence of the Demand Requirement
The derivative suit is considered an extraordinary remedy which
should be made available only after all other means of redress have
failed. 142 The demand requirement has been called "fundamental" to
the concept of the shareholders' derivative suit143 and is based on the
premise that the corporation should be given the opportunity to conduct
its own litigation as it is the primary party in interest.144 It is only after
the proper representatives of the corporation have failed in their duty to
act in its behalf that the complaining shareholders' right to act arises. 145
This rationale for the demand requirement appears to be particularly
compelling when it is remembered that directors of corporations are
46
presumed to act in good faith.
In addition to the theoretical aspects of the rule, the demand requirement in shareholders' actions serves several practical functions. For
example, a demand made upon the board serves to enlighten directors
who are unaware of the alleged wrong, and may precipitate action when
directors are aware of a wrong but are hesitant to act. 47 The demand
requirement also gives directors the opportunity to demonstrate to complaining shareholders that the information on which they base their
139. New CAL. CORP. CODE §800. See text accompanying notes 185-188 infra for
exceptions.
140. New CAL. CORP. CODE §800.
141. New CAL. CORP. CODE §800; see also CAL. CoRP. CODE §834.
142. Note, Demand on Directors and Shareholders as a Prerequisiteto a Derivative
Suit, 73 HARV. L. REV. 746, 748 (1960).
143. Note, Shareholders' Derivative Suits in Minnesota: Function and Operation of
the ControlRequirements, 54 MINN. L. REv. 978, 987 (1970).
144. Developments in the Law-Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71
HARV. L. REV. 874, 952 (1958).
145. Note, Shareholders' Derivative Suits in Minnesota: Function and Operation of
the ControlRequirements, 54 MINN. L. REV. 978, 987 (1970).
146. L TrN, supra note 3, § 105. See note 28 supra.
147. Note, Shareholders' Derivative Suits in Minnesota: Function and Operation of
the Control Requirements, 54 MIn. L. REv. 978, 988 (1970).

Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 7

complaint is erroneous or their conclusions are mistaken, thereby avoiding unnecessary litigation. 148 Furthermore, the cumulative effect of
such demands may have a beneficial effect on the management of the
corporation.' 49 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, compliance
with the complaining shareholders' demands entirely precludes the need
for litigation. 150

It should also be noted that the law will excuse

complainants from the demand requirement where such a demand
would be futile,' 5 ' as where fraud, conspiracy, or criminal conduct by a
majority of the board is alleged. 52 It would seem that the rationale for
the demand requirement in shareholders' actions applies equally as well
to creditors' derivative suits. The strong practical and theoretical considerations appear to far outweigh the very slight burden the requirement imposes on potential plaintiffs.
2. Creditors' Derivative Actions-Absence of the Security For Expenses Requirement

The New California Corporations Code imposes no security deposit
requirement on creditors who wish to maintain a derivative action. In
contrast, both the Old and the New Corporations Codes provide that in

most shareholders' derivative actions the court, upon motion by the
defendant or the corporation, may require plaintiffs to post security for

the anticipated expenses of the corporation arising from the litigation.188
Should the shareholders fail in the action, the corporation is reimbursed
from the deposit. The security deposit requirement first appeared in a
New York statute'5 and has been adopted in only a handful of states.' 55

The New York statute, 5 ' which requires only those with small holdings to post security, was adopted after a special committee of the New
York Chamber of Commerce reported that the filing of meritless deriva148. Id.
149. Note, Demand on Directors and Shareholders as a Prerequisite to a Derivative
Suit, 73 HARv.L. REv. 746, 748 (1960).
150. Id. Compliance with a shareholders' demand that an action be brought against
a director obviously would not avoid litigation. However, compliance would place the
corporation behind the suit, which removes the danger of a secret settlement between
the complaining shareholders and the defendant director. Id. at 749.
151. Gottesfeld v. Richmaid Ice Cream Co., 115 Cal. App. 2d 854, 860, 252 P.2d
973, 978 (1953); Reed v. Norman, 152 Cal. App. 2d 892, 898, 314 P.2d 204, 207
(1957).
152. Reed v. Norman, 152 Cal. App. 2d 892, 898, 314 P.2d 204, 208 (1957).
153. CAL. CORP. CoDne §834; New CAL. CoRP. CoDn §800. For a discussion of security deposits in shareholders' actions under the New Code, see Comment, California's New General CorporationLaw: Prospects for Minority Shareholders, this volume
at 706.
154. Ballantine, Abuses of Shareholders Derivative Suits: How Far Is California's
New "Security for Expenses" Act Sound Regulation?, 37 CAL.L REV. 399, 400 (1949).
155. Article, Security for Expenses in Shareholders'Derivative Suits: 23 Years' Experience, 4 COLiuM. J. L. Soc. PROB. 50, 54 n.27 (1968).
156. N.Y. Bus. CoRP. IAw §627 (McKinney 1963).
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five suits with the intent of obtaining a settlement had become a "racket" reaching "epidemic proportions.' 157 Thus the primary purpose of
the security deposit requirement is to deter so-called strike suits.15
The California provisions differ significantly from those found in
other states. The court may impose the requirement on any shareholder, regardless of the number of shares owned, 59 upon motion by either
the defendant directors or the corporation. 60 The court may grant a
motion for security on either of two grounds: (1) there is no reasonable
possibility that the prosecution of the action will benefit the corporation
or its shareholders; or (2) the movant, if other than the corporation, did
not participate in the transaction complained of.'' Thus the California
statute proceeds on the theory that a preliminary inquiry into the good
faith of a "voluntary champion!' is appropriate.' 62 The requirement is
also considered by some to be necessary to offset the expenses arising
from provisions requiring the corporation to indemnify directors who
successfully defend against derivative actions, 168 although this consideration seems less compelling with the advent of director and officer
indemnification insurance.' 64 California's security for expenses provisions are generally considered by legal commentators to be more fair
than those found in other states.' 65 Many legal writers, however,
disapprove of any form of security requirement as an unjustified impediment to the maintaining of a derivative action.' 66
157. For a critique of this report and the New York statute, see Hornstein, Death
Knell of Stockholders' Derivative Suits in New York, 32 CAL. L. REv. 123 (1944).
158. LATIN, supra note 3, §115; Ballantine, Abuses of Shareholders Derivative
Suits: How Far Is California's New "Security for Expenses" Act Sound Regulation?,
37 CAL. L. Rsv. 399, 399-400 (1949); Note, Shareholders' Derivative Suits in Minnesota: Function and Operation of the Control Requirements, 54 MINN. L Rnv. 978, 1005
(1970); Article, Security for Expenses in Shareholders' Derivative Suits: 23 Years' Experience, 4 COLm J.L. Soc. Non. 50, 50 (1968); Developments in the Law-Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71 HARv. L Ruv. 874, 957 (1958); Note, Security for Expenses Legislation-Summary, Analysis, and Critique, 52 COLuM. L. REv.
267, 281 (1952).
159. CAL. CoRP. CODE §834; New CAL. CORP. CODE §800.
160. CAL. CoRP. CODE §834; New CAL. CORP. CODE §800.
161. CAL. CoRP. CODE §834; New CAL. CORP. CODE §800.
162. 2 G. HORNsTEIN, CORPORATION AW AND PRACr CE §722, at 224 (1959) [hereinafter cited as 2 HoRNsrEswl.
163. M. FEnuEr, PERsoNAL LIrAnirrms oF Copwon EAOFiCERtS AND DmIcroRs 180
(2d ed. 1974); W. KNEPPER, supra note 1, §14.01, at 374; Ballantine, Abuses of Shareholders Derivative Suits: How Far Is Californias New "Security for Expenses" Act
Sound Regulation?, 37 CAL. L. Rv. 399 (1949). Existing California indemnification
provisions are found in CAL. CORP. CODE §830. For new indemnification provisions,
see note 195 infra.
164. See CAL. CORP. CODE §830; New CAL CORP. CODE §317.
165. Ballantine, Abuses of Shareholders Derivative Suits: How Far Is California's
New "Security for Expenses" Act Sound Regulation?, 37 CAL. L. REv. 399, 417 (1949);
Developments in the Law-Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71 HAv. L.
REv. 874, 958 (1958).
166. 2 HORNSTEIN, supra note 162, §722; Article, Security for Expenses in Shareholders' Derivative Suits: 23 Years Experience, 4 CoLUM. J. L. So. PROB. 50, 50 & n.1
(1968).

Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 7

Assuming that California's security requirements serve a valid purpose in some situations, it may be that they are unnecessary in creditors'
derivative actions brought under Section 316 of the New Code. This
section does not permit creditors to bring a derivative action based on
vague allegations of fraud or mismanagement, but limits such suits to
three specific, well defined causes of action. 167 The limited application
of the section appears to render it ill-suited for use in a strike suit. As
the primary purpose of the security requirement is deterrence of strike
suits, 168 there is little need to impose this requirement.'"
3.

Creditors'DerivativeActions-Attorneys Fees

Shareholders who successfully prosecute a derivative action are entitled to an award of their attorneys' fees."" With the creation of the
creditors' derivative action under Section 316 of the New Code, the
question arises as to whether creditors who successfully sue in the name
of the corporation should also be entitled to reimbursement for their
attorneys' fees.
In California the award of attorneys' fees in derivative actions is not
based on a statute, but on the equitable doctrine of the "common
fund." M This doctrine provides that when a plaintiff obtains a judgment for the benefit of others, a common fund is created from which the
plaintiff may be reimbursed for his or her attorneys' fees.' 72 Thus the
fees are not paid by the unsuccessful party, but by all those who benefit
from the judgment. 1 7 The doctrine is applied to prevent persons who
did not participate in the litigation from profiting at the expense of those
who did participate1 4 Further justification for the doctrine is that it
encourages minority shareholders, who may have a small monetary stake
in the outcome, to initiate proper litigation by assuring payment of their
litigation expenses.' 75 In Fletcher v. A. J. Industries, Inc.,170 the
167. See note 124 supra.
168. See note 158 supra.
169. It is unfortunate that the drafters of New CAL. CORP. CODE §316, in properly
deleting the security deposit requirement, used language which sweeps a little too broadly
and thereby deleted the desirable demand requirement. See text accompanying notes
142-152 supra.
170. 1 BALLANTINE & STERLING, supra note 17, §90.06.
171. Fletcher v. A. J.Indus., Inc., 266 Cal. App. 2d 313, 320, 72 Cal. Rptr. 146,
150 (1968).
172. 1 BALLANTINE & STERLING, supra note 17, §90.06.
173. Id. 2 HoENsTEiN, supra note 162, §732. For a discussion of the evolution
of this doctrine, see generally Hornstein, The Counsel Fee in Stockholder's Derivative
Suits, 39 CoLTJM. L. REv. 784 (1939).
174. Fletcher v. A. J. Indus., Inc., 266 Cal. App. 2d 313, 324, 72 Cal. Rptr. 146,
152-53 (1968).
175. Professor Fletcher has written:
The liberal allowance of counsel fees to the champion of the rights of a group
is the dynamic factor giving the necessary impetus and incentive to the volun-
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common fund doctrine was extended to require the corporation to pay
the attorneys' fees of the complaining shareholder when a derivative
action results in a non-pecuniary "substantial benefit" to the corporation. 17 The court maintained that the shareholders' derivative suit is
an effective tool for policing the management of a corporation and that
therefore the recovery of attorneys' fees should not be limited to cases
which produce a monetary judgment. 178 The court went on to declare
that a "substantial benefit" arises whenever the action either maintains
the health of the corporation by raising the standards of fiduciary
relationships or prevents an abuse which would be prejudicial to the
rights and interests of the corporation or affects the enjoyment of a right
essential to the shareholders' interests. 1 9 Applying this holding to the
facts before it, the court ordered payment of attorneys' fees because the
suit resulted in a removal of some directors, even though the suit was
settled and the issue of wrongdoing by the removed directors was left for
future arbitration.8 0
The "common fund" rationale for awarding attorneys' fees in shareholders' actions seems to apply equally well to creditors' derivative suits
when a monetary judgment is recovered.' 8 ' Awarding fees prevents
creditors who did not join in the action from recovering at the expense
of the creditors who prosecuted the action. However, the appropriateness of these awards is not as apparent when a creditors' action results
only in a non-monetary "substantial benefit" to the corporation, as the
articulated rationale for such awards in shareholders' actions18 2 is not
necessarily apposite to creditors' derivative suits. First, the award is not
necessary to encourage proper litigation, as creditors, unlike many miteer method of representation in class and derivative suits. Otherwise no one
individual could afford to begin a suit of such size and difficulty or undertake
to resist an unfair settlement.
13 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA Op Tim LAw OF PRIVATE ConPonTIoNs §6045, at 563
(perm. ed. rev. 1970).
The doctrine encourages proper litigation by assuring that successful attorneys will be
compensated. Fletcher v. A. J. Indus., Inc., 266 Cal. App. 2d 313, 324, 72 Cal. Rptr.
146, 152-53 (1968).
176. 266 Cal. App. 2d 313, 72 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1968).
177. Id. at 320-22, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 150-51.
178. Id. at 324, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 153.
179. Id.; see also 1 BALLNTNE & STEEuNG, supra note 17, §90.06.
180. Fletcher v. AJ. Indus., Inc., 266 Cal. App. 2d 313, 325, 72 Cal. Rptr. 146,
153 (1968).
181. Professor Hornstein, discussing recovery of fees in class actions, noted that
"[cireditors suits were the earliest and still the most frequent illustration" of the application of the common fund doctrine. Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics: The "Salvage"
Factor in Counsel Fee Awards, 69 HARV. L REv. 658, 662 (1956).
The award of attorneys' fees would encourage proper litigation in situations where,
due to limited assets recoverable from a director, a creditor may be discouraged from
suing in light of the probable division of the recovery among several creditors. See text
accompanying note 134 supra.
182. See notes 174-175 and accompanying text supra.
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nority shareholders, will generally have a sufficient financial interest at
stake to prompt action when directors act to impair that interest. One
may even wonder whether suits to police corporate management' 83 are
"proper litigation" when prosecuted by outsiders whose interests may be
inimical to those of the corporation. Second, the award is not necessary
to prevent non-participating creditors from receiving a recovery at the
suing creditors' expense, as there is no recovery by creditors when the
judgment provides only a substantial benefit to the corporation. The
sole basis for awarding attorneys' fees to the creditor who prosecutes a
creditors' derivative suit which results only in a substantial benefit to the
corporation would seem to be the notion that the corporation should pay
for the benefit it has received. If the courts choose to award fees on this
basis, they should take care to do so only when the value of the nonmonetary "substantial benefit" approximates the amount of fees awarded.,

84

B. Suits by ShareholdersUnderSection 316
Subdivision (c) of Section 316 of the New Code' 85 permits shareholders to sue directors in the name of the corporation without meeting
the demand and security requirements normally required in derivative
actions""8 when either of the following causes of action is alleged: (1)
a distribution on any shares which are junior to other outstanding shares
with respect to a liquidation of assets, when such distribution is in
derogation of the senior shares' liquidation preference; 8 7 or (2) a
distribution on any shares which are junior to other outstanding shares
with respect to payment of a dividend, when such distribution is in
derogation of the senior shares' dividend preference.188
As already noted, the requirement of a demand on the corporation is
based on the notion that a shareholder should pursue all his or her
183. See text accompanying note 178 supra.
184. The dissent in Fletcher noted:
if the existence of a "common fund" protected or increased by stockholders'
actions is not a prerequisite to the allowance of fees the officers and directors
may well be faced with a liquidation of assets to pay fees, even though the
resulting harm to the corporation might be disproportionate to the "substantial
benefits" derived from the lawsuit.
Fletcher v. A. J. Indus., Inc., 266 Cal. App. 2d 313, 329-30, 72 Cal. Rptr. 146, 156-57
(1968) (Christian, J., dissenting). Apparently this consideration was not sufficient to
prevent awarding attorneys' fees in the shareholders' action in Fletcher. However, such
a consideration must be accorded greater weight in creditors' suits, where the sole rationale for awarding fees is to cause the corporation to pay for the benefit it has received.
185. See note 124 supra.
186. New CAL. CORP. CoDE §800.
187. New CAL. CORP. CODE §502.
188. New CAL. CORP. CODE §503; see generally Comment, California'sNew General
CorporationLaw: Dividends and Reacquisitionsof Shares, this volume at 645.

1976 / Directors' Liability
remedies within the corporation before bringing a suit against its directors. 8 ' Further, the demand requirement serves several practical purposes, such as affording the directors an opportunity to comply with the
demand and thereby avoid litigation.' s0 Finally, a demand relative to
unlawful distributions would not necessarily be a futile act, as such
distributions may occur through director negligence.' 9 ' In light of the
small burden the demand requirement places on the complaining shareholder and the possible benefit to be derived from such a requirement, it
is difficult to understand why it should not be applied to shareholders'
derivative actions arising under Section 316 of the New Code.
Section 316 of the New Code further excuses complaining shareholders from the security deposit requirement when a derivative suit is
brought on one of the specified causes of action. 9 2 As noted in the
discussion of creditors' derivative suits, the security deposit requirement
is primarily designed to deter meritless suits brought solely for the
purpose of obtaining a settlement.193 Because the actions which may be

prosecuted pursuant to Section 316 are limited and strictly defined,' 94
they arguably are unsuitable for this purpose. Therefore the rationale
for requiring a security deposit does not apply to suits under this section,
and the requirement is properly deleted.
INDEMNIFICATION OF DECoRs

California's indemnification provisions have been expanded to provide greater protection for the corporate director by permitting advance
payment of indemnification and by requiring indemnification when a

director successfully defends an action.

95

The extent of indemnifica-

189. See notes 142-146 and accompanying text supra.
190. See notes 147-150 and accompanying text supra.
191. See notes 151-152 and accompanying text supra.
192. See text accompanying notes 185-188 supra.
193. See text accompanying notes 154-158 supra.
194. See text accompanying notes 1,85-188 supra.
195. New CAL. CoRP. CODB §317 provides:
(a) For the purposes of this section, "agent" includes any person who is
or was a director, officer, employee or other agent of the corporation, or is
or was serving at the request of the corporation as a director, officer, employee
or agent of another corporation, partnership, joint venture, trust or other enterprise, or was a director, officer, employee or agent of a corporation which was
a predecessor corporation of the corporation or of another enterprise at the request of such predecessor corporation; "proceeding" includes any threatened,
pendngor
completed and
action
or proceeding,
civil,fees
criminal,
administrative or investigative;
"expenses"
includeswhether
attorneys'
ad any
expenses
of establishing a right to indemnification under subdivision (d) or subdivision
(e)(b)
(3). A corporation shall have power to indemnify any person who was
or
is
partyby
or or
is in
threatened
proceeding
that such
reason
of the fact(other
than
the right toto
of the corporation) by any
an aaction
person is or was an agent of the corporation, against expenses, judgments,
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tion permitted depends on the type of action brought against the direcfines, settlements and other amounts actually and reasonably incurred in connection with such proceeding if such person acted in good faith and in a manner such person reasonably believed to be in the best interests of the corporation and, in the case of a criminal proceeding, had no reasonable cause to believe the conduct of such person was unlawful. The termination of any proceeding by judgment, order, settlement, conviction or upon a plea of nolo contendere or its equivalent shall not, of itself, create a presumption that the person did not act in good faith and in a manner which the person reasonably
believed to be in the best interests of the corporation or that the person had
reasonable cause to believe that the person's conduct was unlawful.
(c) A corporation shall have power to indemnify any person who was or
is a party or is threatened to be made a party to any threatened, pending or
completed action by or in the right of the corporation to procure a judgment
in its favor by reason of the fact that such person is or was an agent of the
corporation, against expenses actually and reasonably incurred by such person
in connection with the defense or settlement of such action if such person acted
in good faith, in a manner such person believed to be in the best interests of
the corporation and with such care, including reasonable inquiry, as an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under similar circumstances.
No indemnification shall be made under this subdivision (c):
(1) In respect of any claim, issue or matter as to which such person shall
have been adjudged to be liable to the corporation in the performance of such
pers6n's difty to the corporation, unless and only to the extent that the court
in which such action was brought shall determine upon application that, in
view of all the circumstances of the case, such person is fairly and reasonably
entitled to indemnity for the expenses which such court shall determine;
(2) Of amounts paid in settling or otherwise disposing of a threatened or
pending action, -with or without court approval; or
(3) Of expenses incurred in defending a threatened or pending action
which is settled or otherwise disposed of without court approval.
(d) To the extent that an agent of a corporation has been successful on
the merits in defense of any proceeding referred to in subdivision (b) or (c)
or in defense of any claim, issue or matter therein, the agent shall be indemnified against expenses actually and reasonably incurred by the agent in connection therewith.
(e) Except as provided in subdivision (d), any indemnification under this
section shall be made by the corporation only if authorized in the specific case,
upon a determination that indemnification of the agent is proper in the circumstances because the agent has met the applicable standard of conduct set forth
in subdivision (b) or (c), by:
(1) A majority vote of a quorum consisting of directors who are not parties to such proceeding;
(2) Approval of the shareholders (Section 153), with the shares owned by
the person to be indemnified not being entitled to vote thereon; or
(3) The court in which such proceeding is or was pending upon application
made by the corporation or the agent or the attorney or other person rendering
services in connection with the defense, whether or not such application by the
agent, attorney or other person is opposed by the corporation.
(f) Expenses incurred in defending any proceeding may be advanced by
the corporation prior to the final disposition of such proceeding upon receipt
of an undertaking by or on behalf of the agent to repay such amount unless
it shall be determined ultimately that the agent is entitled to be indemnified
as authorized in this section.
(g) No provision made by a corporation to indemnify its or its subsidiary's
directors or officers for the defense of any proceeding, whether contained in
the articles, bylaws, a resolution of shareholders or directors, an agreement or
otherwise, shall be valid unless consistent with this section. Nothing contained
in this section shall affect any right to indemnification to which persons other
than such directors and officers may be entitled by contract or otherwise.
(h) No indemnification or advance shall be made under this section, except as provided in subdivision (d) or subdivision (e) (3), in any circumstance
where it appears:
(1) That it would be inconsistent with a provision of the articles, bylaws,
a resolution of the shareholders or an agreement in effect at the time of the
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tor. 96 Subdivision (b) of Section 317 of the New Code deals with
indemnification when the action is not brought in the name of the
corporation. It permits the corporation to indemnify a director for
expenses, judgments, fines, and settlements, provided only that the

director acted in good faith and in a manner he or she reasonably
believed to be in the best interests of the corporation. It is specifically

provided that a judgment against the director does not create a presumption that the director acted in bad faith.
Subdivision (c) of Section 317 of the New Code sets forth the indem-

nification permitted when a director is sued in the name of the corporation. A corporation may indemnify its directors for their expenses if
they acted in good faith and without negligence.

Court approval is

required before indemnification may be paid for expenses when a
director is adjudged liable or when an action is settled. Court approval
of settlements in derivative actions appears to be desirable in that it
prevents wrongdoers from quickly disposing of actions by settlement
without compromising the public policy favoring settlements. 9 7
Regardless of whether the action is maintained in the name of the
corporation, the New Code requires a corporation to provide indemnifi-

cation to a director when he or she is successful on the merits of the
action."9 " This provision seems to have merit as it protects those who,
even though successful in the action, are in disfavor with the management. Furthermore, the provision violates no public policy as those
who are vindicated at trial are presumed to be free from fault and

therefore should be entitled to reimbursement for expenses arising by
accrual of the alleged cause of action asserted in the proceeding in which the
expenses were incurred or other amounts were paid, which prohibits or otherwise limits indemnification; or
(2) That it would be inconsistent with any condition expressly imposed by
a court in approving a settlement.
(i) A corporation shall have power to purchase and maintain insurance on
behalf of any agent of the corporation against any liability asserted against or
incurred by the agent in such capacity or arising out of the agent's status as
such whether or not the corporation would have the power to indemnify the
agent against such liability under the provisions of this section.
If enacted, A.B. 2849, 1975-76 Regular Session, will add the following subdivision:
(j) This section does not apply to any proceeding against any trustee, investment manager or other fiduciary of an employee benefit plan in such person's
capacity as such, even though he may also be an agent as defined in subdivision (a) of the employer corporation. Nothing contained in this section shall
affect any right to indemnification to which such a trustee, investment manager
or other fiduciary may be entitled by contract or otherwise.
196. This distinction existed at common law. When a director was sued by a third
party, normal agency rules for indemnification of an agent by his or her principal were
applied. Agency rules of indemnification were considered inapposite, however, when a
corporation sued its directors. Cheek, Control of Corporate Indemnification: A Proposed Statute, 22 VAND. L. REV. 255, 278 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Cheek].
197. Id. at 285-86.
198. New CAL. Corup. CODE §317(d). See note 195 supra.

Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 7

virtue of their service to the corporation.' 99 In situations where indemnification is not mandatory, the director seeking to be indemnified is not
200
permitted to vote on the decision to provide indemnification.
Unlike existing law,21 subdivision (f) of Section 317 of the New
Code permits the corporation to advance expenses to the director with
the agreement that the director shall return the amount of such advance
to the corporation if it is subsequently determined that he or she is not
entitled to indemnification. Under the old indemnification provisions a
director who does not have the resources to wage a protracted legal
battle is often forced to settle an action regardless of how confident he or
she may be as to the ultimate success on the merits. 20 2 By advancing
expenses, the director will be able to defend such an action to a
successful conclusion. 20 s This should provide the added benefit of
deterring strike suits as it will reduce the likelihood that frivolous claims
will be settled. This provision somewhat offsets the loss of protection
against meritless claims that results from the elimination of the requirement that a creditor obtain a judgment against a corporation before
suing the director.20 4
CONCLUSION

Newly enacted Section 309 of the California Corporations Code will
bring order to the existing confusion in California law relating to the
standard of conduct of directors by clearly defining that standard and its
application. The standard set forth requires corporate directors to act
in good faith and without negligence. Directors may avoid liability for
negligence by performing their duties as would a reasonably prudent
person in like circumstances. The degree of care required varies according to the size, type and nature of the corporation and the role of
the director in the corporation. Nevertheless, liability may be imposed
for failure to remain knowledgeable of corporate affairs. No liability
may be incurred for good faith business judgment. This clarification of
the standard of care should enable directors to perform their duties with
less anxiety as to possible liability and should therefore encourage
responsible persons to assume directorships. The creation of a straight199. Cheek, supra note 196, at 282.
200. New CAL. CoRp. CODE §317(e). See note 195 supra.
201. CAL. CoRP. CODE §830.
202. AssEmmLy REPORT, supra note 10, at 61-62; Cheek, supra note 196, at 287.

203. Formerly, advancing directors their litigation expenses was opposed on the
grounds that placing the assets of the corporation behind defendant directors caused minority shareholders to be overwhelmed. Comment, Corporate Responsibility for Litigagation Expenses of Management, 40 CAL. L. REv. 104, 105 (1952).
204. See text accompanying notes 127-128 supra.
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forward standard also affords benefits to shareholders and creditors by
encouraging directors to act within the now discernible borders of
permissible conduct.
Section 316 of the New Code has created a creditors' derivative suit
which is available when directors make an unlawful distribution or loan.
The section exempts creditors' suits and certain shareholders' actions
from the procedural requirements normally found in derivative actions.
While the security for expenses requirement may be inapposite to sucb
suits due to the limited causes of action which may be prosecuted under
this section and is therefore properly excluded, there appears to be little
reason for abandoning the demand requirement as it places a small
burden on the complaining creditor while permitting the corporation to
avoid litigation by meeting the demand or taking other suitable action.
The section is silent as to whether attorneys! fees may be awarded in
creditors' derivative actions, but it appears that fees may be awarded
when a common fund is created by a judgment
Indemnification provisions have been expanded by Section 317 of the
New Code to permit a corporation to advance litigation expenses to
directors who are sued by virtue of their position in the corporation.
This provision allows directors to defend against meritless suits which
they formerly may have been forced to settle. By affording added
protection to directors, this provision will assist California corporations
in attracting competent personnel. The advance indemnification provision does not jeopardize protection of shareholders as it places no
restrictions on bringing an action but merely permits directors to adequately defend actions and thereby deter meritless suits.
The New California Corporations Code appears to carefully tread the
narrow ground between the twin pitfalls of inadequate shareholder and
creditor protection and excessive director exposure to liability. The
New Code's requirement of absolute good faith is inherent in the trust
relationship which exists between a corporation and its directors. The
prescribed standard of care of the ordinarily prudent person in a like
position under similar circumstances provides reasonable protection to
shareholders by requiring directors to actively participate and remain
cognizant of corporate affairs. On the other hand, this standard conforms to corporate realities by recognizing the varying roles of directors
in corporations of diverse nature and size, and by permitting directors to
rely in good faith upon information received from knowledgeable and
trusted persons. The newly created creditors' derivative action enhances
creditors' protection by assuring equitable distribution of judgments
recovered from errant directors. Liability of directors is largely unaf-
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fected by this provision, as it creates no new causes of action. Whatever
increase in directors' exposure to suits may result would seem to be more
than offset by the new provisions permitting advance indemnification
and requiring indemnification when a director successfully defends an
action.
DouglasPaul Wiita

